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tors of the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, Bishops' Committee 
on Pro-life Activities on Aug. 9, 1988 
in Denver, Colorado. 
Introduction 
The work of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Bishops' 
Committee for Pro-Life Activities, and Joseph Cardinal Bernardin in 
promoting a fuller public discussion of medical issues pertaining to the 
elective use of life-sustaining treatments has been insightful, nuanced, and 
constructive. I join you in this discussion as a friend and as a colleague in 
your concern for the practice of health care to explore with you the debate 
about the elective discontinuation of nourishment. Within medical ethics, 
this debate is especially complex and challenging. Conventional wisdom 
holds that this debate is simply about whether the decision-making 
principles developed for evaluating life-sustaining technologies may be 
extended to tube feedings. Critics, of whom I am one, while accepting that 
there are circumstances when tube feedings are not obligatory, wonder 
whether equating nourishment with other medical treatment is either 
necessary, sufficient, or wise. 
As we debate the adequacy of the nourishment as treatment equation, we 
must keep in mind that the public discussion of the elective provision or 
withholding of nourishment is heard by two audiences: public policy and 
private hearts. In public policy, this debate addresses the concerns of institu-
tions and professional groups. This is a debate about the public conduct of 
institutions. When dying occurs at home, sips of broth lovingly tendered by 
family caregivers to the limit of satiety fulfill the moral obligation to feed and 
to care. Today, when 80 percent of deaths are in institutions, the recognized 
physiologic inadequacy of these same sips of broth provoke a moral crisis 
about the conduct of public life. Can food for the vulnerable and voiceless 
who are dependent on our institutions be elective? This question and our 
discomfort with our own judgment is magnified by the immense costs of 
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sustaining such persons. This debate is heard in the private hearts of 
families, patients, and health care practitioners at an hour of medical 
catastrophe where the foundations of interpersonal faithfulness are re-
examined, tested, and hopefully learned anew. 
A New Policy Solution 
The current resolution to the question of whether food and water are 
elective is the proposal that nourishment simply be considered as a medical 
treatment. As such, nourishment is elective and may be withdrawn if it 
does not serve the patient's interests or preference. It is important to note 
that the equation of nourishment with medical treatment is not an ancient 
truth, but is a newly minted social policy designed to permit the 
discontinuation of nourishment under certain circumstances. This 
solution is recent: created, articulated, and endorsed by a President's 
Commission, the American Medical Association, and several courts over 
just the last five years. 
The success of this equation in permitting nourishment to be 
discontinued under extreme circumstances, mainly coma and endstage 
dementia, has muted criticism of the limitations and dangers of this 
artifice. In the Raquenna and Jobes decisions, courts have dispensed with 
the objections of nurses or sectarian health care facilities which dissent 
from this equation. The potential for this new equation to undermine the 
entitlement to food for vulnerable persons has been only cursorily 
examined. The possible usefulness of alternative understandings of the 
problem of nourishment have generated little interest. 
Three Vignettes 
I would propose that the debate about elective nourishment should be 
more fundamentally examined at the level of the definition of 
nourishment. I would like to explore this question through three vignettes 
which, to my mind, illuminate the importance of this perspective. 
* A short time ago, I visited a public long term care hospital for the 
chronically mentally ill to do a series of lectures on geriatric medicine. 
During a tour of the facility, the medical director asked me if I would like 
to see the "feeding ward". I assented and we went to a back ward area 
consisting of two rooms with nine beds against two walls, 18 beds per 
room, 36 for the ward. On each bed was a lump, entirely covered by a 
blanket. At the head of the bed was a pump on a pole from which a tube 
ran under the blanket. A single nurse serviced 18 patients; she sat at a small 
desk in the corner ofthe room. The ward was still. The medical director, a 
man about 50, told me with some pride that he had created a new life form. 
"I call them 'gerons'," he said. I asked him if any of the patients had been 
involved in the decisions leading to this kind of support. He said, "No, by 
the time they reach the stage where the tube is placed, they have long since 
been unable to participate in their care." I asked if the families attended 
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these people. "No," he said, "families get quite discouraged by this kind of 
situation and stop coming." I asked if there was any ongoing review of 
whether this type of care should continue. He said, "Oh, no, that would be 
unthinkable. " 
What is this nurse to thes.e patients, without family, without advocates, a 
caregiver surrogate for society's respect for the vulnerable or a 
biotechnician serving fragile bio-mechanical systems? Is this automated 
feeding ward an expression of ethical commitment or the result of an 
ethical paralysis? 
* A 65-year old man was dying of disseminated colon cancer. He was 
cared for by his wife, a wonderful Australian nurse, a joyous, forthright 
woman. We had many times discussed the coming end of his life; he was 
beyond chemotherapy and had rejected resuscitation and other life-
sustaining therapies. Shortly before going home, he had however, taken a 
transfusion for extra strength to attend his son's wedding. While at home 
on a home hospice program, he slipped and broke his leg from a cancerous 
bone deposit. He was admitted to the hospital. During the last six weeks of 
his life, all he could take was fluids which were conveyed by the hand of his 
wife. In the hospital, he passed into a coma and appeared insensate to 
suffering. His wife came to me, acknowledging that he was dying, 
acknowledging that fluids could not sustain.his life, acknowledging that he 
probably could not feel thirst, and yet still requested an IV so that the 
fluids might continue. An IV was placed and he died a day or so later. 
Was this IVa pointless invasion of a dying man which in no way served 
an identifiable medical interest? Probably. But is this IV better seen as a 
response which recognized that the offering and partaking of fluids over 
the preceding six weeks of his dying had acquired a vital symbolic meaning 
of a nurturing, faithful relationship? Would he not have altruistically 
consented to his wife's request? I thought so. 
* A woman was dying of breast cancer in a home hospice program. Her 
family had been lovingly involved in her care. As not infrequently 
happens, she passed into a coma shortly before her death and her final 
hours were distressing to the family who readmitted her to a hospital. 
Observing the care plan of this dying and unconscious woman, the 
dietitian did not order meals. The family expressed discomfort over this 
lack of feeding. Meal trays were ordered, brought to the bedside stand 
where they stood as a mealtime offering for a suitable interval before they 
were removed, uneaten. 
Is thisjust a silly piece of magic? Or, is this uneaten tray at the bedside an 
element in a profoundly important, deeply moving, family ritual, (like the 
last rites, which themself involve food) in which a family expresses its 
continued faithfulness to the humanity and importance of a dying loved 
one? 
These three cases challenge both reason and feeling. What is it about the 
prefectly administered, physiologically sound nourishment of the feeding 
ward that strikes us as such a grotesque caricature of feeding? And, what 
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is it about the simple presence of the uneaten tray at the bedside that strikes 
us as absurd but profoundly definitive of the essence of nourishing? I 
believe that the answer to these questions lies in the communitarian 
context of nourishment, an aspect which I would now briefly explore. 
Feeding and Alimentation 
Nourishment is a transaction between two parties. I feed you, you take 
food from me.' As a transaction, nourishing is composed of a spectrum of 
actions: offering food, encouraging a person to eat, seeing that sufficient 
food is available to relieve hunger and thirst, and finally sustaining life. 
These acts are morally distinct. Even if it were decided that it is improper to 
delay death, it might still be proper to offer food, to encourage one to 
partake of it, or to relieve hunger or thirst. 
Caregivers and patients approach this transaction from different sides 
and thus bear different moral responsibilities and moral authority for the 
various nourishing actions. Even if we grant that a patient has primary 
authority for evaluating life-sustaining nourishment, the patient's 
preferences in this matter may not void a caregiver's duty to offer food, to 
make food available, or to see that hunger or thirst are relieved. Resolution 
of who has the greater authority in disputes is more complex than whether 
we are speaking of the giving (caregiver's) or taking (patient's) side of the 
transaction. For underlying this transaction is the fact that patients and 
caregivers may be engaging in two fundamentally different kinds of 
interactions which take place simultaneously. I call these interactions 
"alimentation" and "feeding." 
Nourishment may be "alimentation," a medical operation intended to 
achieve physiologic objectives and enforced by medical monitoring. As a 
physiologic intervention, alimentation belongs to the ethics of elective 
medical treatments . It may be excessively burdensome or futile as a 
technique or in relation to unobtainable ends. Individuals, sometimes 
through intimate surrogates who speak on their behalf, are responsible for 
evaluating and consent to this invasion. 
Nourishment is also an act of caregiving that I call "feeding." Feeding is 
morally defined in a broader, non-medical, cultural experience. In our 
daily lives, feeding is an integral part of sharing the experience of human 
passage. Consider the full associations of breast-feeding, wedding feasts, 
the food brought to the bereaved. (I must say that if a medical student ever 
claimed that breast-feeding was simply an inter-organismal transfer of an 
aqueous-colloid solution, I would greatly fear that he had been irreparably 
damaged by too much education.) Feeding is also an expression of our 
vital interdependence on one another, as it is celebrated in Thanksgiving 
and potluck. Finally, in the Seder or the Eucharist, the shared meal is the 
most perfect image of moral relationship: shared, life-sustaining, peaceful, 
and holy. 
The ethic of feeding is quite unlike the ethic of treatments. Feeding is not 
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about physiologic ends - it is about faithfulness. Thus, decisions about 
feeding rest on an interpersonal, communal foundation. We need a 
different, non-physiologic medical ethic to fully address the problem of 
feeding. A foundation for this ethic is suggested by the origins of the word 
"care." The word "care" is not related to the Latin "caritas" or charity; it is 
of Germanic origin: the word "chara" means "lament." An "ethic of 
lament" is quite unlike an ethic of treatment. It juxtaposes love for a 
human life with a recognition of mortality. It is fundamentally 
interpersonal, mediated through common symbols and usages. In lament 
for the irreversibly ill, problems of caring for a body are examined in light 
of the duties of faithfulness and the integrity of caregivers. The duties of 
lament require a steadfast presence and a letting go which can well 
accommodate the full range of options for nourishment. This is quite 
unlike a medical ethic where the duties of faithfulness are defined by the 
possibilities of physiology. 
Public Policy and Private Lives 
A public resolution of the tensions posed by feeding and alimentation will 
be very difficult. The position that nourishment is simply a medical 
treatment is a shallow, one-sided artifice that was designed to permit the 
discontinuation of nourishment. This medicalized view does not adequately 
protect the entitlement to food for disabled persons. It is not adequate for 
understanding the complex reactions of families and some health 
professionals to this issue. Insisting that nourishment is a treatment 
persuades us to do violence to families who would feed, suggesting that their 
quest to be faithful should be voided as a psychological problem motivated 
by irrational denial, magical thinking, or a wish to be destructive of a 
patient's autonomy. Likewise, the position that nourishment is the essence 
of keeping faith with the vulnerable is unbalanced. It suggests a public 
policy that would mandate nourishment. Divorced from loving and 
individualized judgments, it leads us straight to the feeding ward. 
Modernized nourishment technology is advanced to the degree that we 
must exercise discretion in its use. Thus, the issue of elective nourishment 
is not a place to make the fundamental stand against medical killing even 
though the routine cessation of life-sustaining nourishment could easily 
become a de facto form of euthanasia for the vulnerable. Unfortunately, 
the distinction between withholding nourishment on the morally 
unacceptable judgment that a person is not worthy oflife and between the 
sometimes appropriate conclusion that continued alimentation is an 
unconsented to and burdensome invasion is a distinction which exists in 
the hearts of those involved. The act of withholding nourishment does not 
reveal the heart's intent. The elusiveness and importance of this distinction 
is the heart of the statement signed by many prominent ethicists, 
theologians, and physicians which I was honored to sign. 2 
We return to the two discussions about elective nourishment - to 
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public policy and private hearts. Public policy is a crude instrument which 
should affirm important values as it accommodates with nuanced and 
flexible wisdom, the surprising individuality of human problems. Public 
policy for health care institutions must come to some kind of 
accommodation with elective alimentation, one that does not do violence 
to the family claim to feed . In doing so, a medical ethic will have to strive 
for a broader more inclusive accommodation with the symbolic language 
of families than has been possible with the "patient autonomy and best 
interests" language we now employ.3 Public policy will need to provide 
much better protections for vulnerable persons - not just ombudsman, 
but more sensitively trained health care providers as well. 
In the realm of the heart, at the time of medical catastrophe, intense 
emotions of love and loss and fear can cause moral confusion and 
impUlsive action. Pastoral guidance for distressed family and professional 
caregivers is urgently needed: guidance, not judgment. The secrets of the 
heart's intention and of the measure of its remorse at the loss of what is 
precious will guard many of these decisions from our verdict. 
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